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Abstract: 
 
Regional integration in- and outside Europe is a theoretical and empirical puzzle for 
Political Scientists. After 50 years of integration studies, there is still a gap in the 
academic discussion. On the one hand, New Institutionalism mainly discusses the 
successful example of European integration and argues about the influence of 
supranational vs. intergovernmental institutions. On the other hand, International 
Political Economy debates the emergence of more and more preferential trade 
agreements around the world, but neglects the dynamic of regional integration. In 
order to overcome these deficits, this paper proposes a new approach to regional 
economic integration, which simultaneously overcomes the Eurocentrism of 
Institutionalism and the static nature of Political Economy approaches. According to 
this view, regional economic integration results from demand and supply factors. 
Thereby, demand and supply of regional integration needs not be the same as in 
Europe. Whereas comparative cost advantages and economies of scale are 
important factors for the demand for regional integration in Europe and North 
America, the attraction of foreign direct investments and development aid may be 
more important for regions of the South. And whereas common institutions are a 
driving force behind integration in Europe and South America, regional integration in 
North America and Southern Africa may be more supplied by regional hegemony. 
Integration dynamic may evolve if feedback effects occur and one or more of the 
demand and supply factors are reinforced due to previous integration steps. But such 
‘spill-over’ may also look different than the European example, as the economic and 
institutional preconditions differ. After developing such a theoretical approach, the 
proposed paper will illustrate its hypotheses using the example of the EU, the 
NAFTA, the MERCOSUR, the SADC and the ASEAN.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Regional integration outside Europe is still a puzzle for Political Science. The 
academic discussion about regional integration still concentrates on the European 
example and widely neglects other regional integration schemes. The old debate 
between Neofunctionalists (Haas 1958, Schmitter 2002) and Intergovernementalists 
(Hoffmann 1968, Moravcsik 1998) focuses only on the European Union (EU), and the 
various approaches of the so-called New Institutionalism are also mainly applied to 
EU policy-making (Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996, Pierson 1996, Pollack 1997, Stone 
Sweet and Sandholtz 1997). This obvious gap in the literature is even more striking if 
one keeps in mind the growing importance of regional integration outside Europe. 
The phrase ‘New Regionalism’ captures the phenomenon that a growing number of 
regional integration schemes have emerged around the world since the early 1990s. 
Regionalism has become a distinguishing feature of the international system, and 
most of the regional integration schemes outside Europe seem to have consolidated 
in recent years – even if they are not as advanced as the EU. The problem for the 
analysis of regional integration outside Europe is that integration theories which were 
developed in the European context cannot simply be applied to other regions, 
because the economic and political preconditions for integration on other continents 
differ widely (Haas 1967, Mattli 2005, Robson 1993). Thus, the crucial question is, 
how the different theories of European integration can be fruitfully employed to 
establish a theoretical approach for regional integration outside of Europe. 
 
Approaches to the systematic comparison of regional integration schemes in- 
and outside Europe can mainly be found outside of the Political Science ‘mainstream’ 
in the field of International Political Economy. Scholars from this discipline analyse 
why states decide to integrate their economies (Mansfield and Milner 1999, Schirm 
2002), under which circumstances this is successful (Mansfield, Milner and 
Rosendorff 2002, Mattli 1999), and what the consequences for the creation or 
distortion of international trade are (Dür 2006, Krueger 1999). However, the 
shortcoming of these approaches to the study of regional integration is that they all 
regard regional integration more as an end than as a process. They do not analyse 
the dynamic of regional integration schemes and the reasons behind this 
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development. This is a surprising shortcoming 15 years after the start of the ‘New 
Wave of Regionalism’, especially given the fact that many integration schemes 
outside Europe were significantly reformed in recent years. Thus, additional research 
is needed to analyse the dynamics of regional integration outside Europe (Mansfield 
and Reinhardt 2003). 
 
The aim of this paper is to propose a theoretical approach to the systematic 
analysis and comparison of regional economic integration dynamics in- and outside 
of Europe. Therefore, it aims to bridge the gap between the New Institutionalism in 
EU studies and the International Political Economy in comparative regional 
integration studies, and to overcome the respective shortcomings of these 
approaches. In the following, the paper conceives regional integration as a club good 
(Mattli 1999, Padoan 2001). I.e. non-members of a regional integration scheme can 
be excluded from its consumption, but the members of the scheme nevertheless face 
cooperation and coordination problems when supplying the good. As Mattli (1999) 
points out, the success of providing such a club good can then be traced back to 
certain demand and supply factors. However, in contrast to Mattli, this paper does 
not adopt a static view of demand and supply factors, but focuses on dynamic 
feedback mechanisms and interactions between the two factors. The question is not 
only whether or not specific demand and supply factors are given in a certain region, 
but also whether they may change during the process of regional economic 
integration in order to make further integration steps possible. In this way, regional 
integration schemes may be able to produce the necessary conditions for their 
success, and self-contained integration dynamics may emerge. 
 
In its first part, the paper develops a theoretical approach for the analysis of 
regional integration dynamics in- and outside of Europe. Thereby, it relies on the 
International Political Economy in order to identify the demand for regional integration 
and on the New Institutionalism in order to analyse supply factors. Most important for 
the dynamic of integration is the question of how initial integration may feed back on 
one of those factors. In the subsequent empirical part, the theoretical approach is 
illustrated by applying it to the five most important regional integration schemes, 
which are the EU, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Mercado 
Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), the Southern African Development Community 
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(SADC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The conclusion 
summarises the most important arguments of the paper and gives an outlook on 
further research. 
 
2. Towards a New Approach to Regional Integration 
 
In order to develop the theoretical approach, the paper proceeds in three steps. 
It starts by identifying different demand factors for regional economic integration. The 
demand factors for regional integration outside Europe may differ widely from the 
European example, because many integration schemes consist of less-developed 
countries. Subsequently, different supply factors of regional economic integration are 
identified. These are also fundamentally different from the EU, because no other 
regional integration scheme is familiar with supranational institutions which are as 
strong as the Commission or the European Court of Justice. And finally, possible 
feedback mechanisms on economic demands for and institutional supply of regional 
integration are worked out. This is the point where regional integration could gain 
self-sustaining dynamic if initial steps of regional integration change the demand for 
and the supply of regional integration in a way that makes further integration steps 
possible. 
 
2.1 International Political Economy and the Demand for Regional Integration  
 
The central precondition for the establishment of a regional economic 
integration scheme is that the participating states expect significant gains from such 
integration. States face significant costs when participating in such a scheme, 
because they must restrict their sovereignty and must adapt to new rules. They will 
only agree to participate if the expected utility of regional integration exceeds the 
respective costs. This argument is based on the assumption that states cannot be 
forced to participate in a regional integration scheme. Thus, integration by force – as 
happened in the framework of colonialism – is not included in this theoretical 
approach. 
 
The International Political Economy usually stresses that the utilisation of 
comparative cost advantages and economies of scale are the main rationale behind 
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regional economic integration (Mattli 1999, Padoan 2001, Schirm 2002). Accordingly, 
the aim of regional integration is mainly to abolish step-by-step tariffs and non-tariff 
trade barriers between the member states – from a free trade area over a customs 
union, a single market, economic and monetary union and finally to political union 
(Balassa 1961). Such market integration simplifies intraregional trade, which allows 
member states to concentrate on the production of goods where they have 
comparative cost advantages, and to profit from access to larger markets. However, 
the extent of the gains from comparative cost advantages and economies of scale 
depends strongly on the structure of the participating economies. The gains from 
intraregional trade are likely to be higher if participating economies are specialised in 
the production of different goods and if they are well developed in order to constitute 
attractive markets for each other. If member states of a regional integration scheme 
produce similar goods and are less developed, intraregional trade is much less 
important. For this reason, the International Political Economy often states that the 
prospects for regional integration are better in the North than they are in the South 
(Mattli 1999). 
 
However, the utilisation or comparative cost advantages and economies of 
scale are not the only – and for developing countries probably not even the most 
important – gains of regional integration (Robson 1993). Instead, regional integration 
can also be part of a development strategy, wherein participating countries use 
integration in order to become more appealing to foreign investors or donors of 
development aid. Small states, which may not be interesting as markets per se, 
become more attractive for investors if they provide access to larger, regionally 
integrated markets (Büthe and Milner 2005, Schirm 2002). And instable states, which 
face difficulties concerning credible commitment to investor- or donor-friendly 
policies, become more attractive if they bind themselves to certain policies within a 
regional integration scheme.  
 
Another gain of regional integration is that the participating member states can 
improve their standing within the international system by belonging to a larger 
regional integration scheme. E.g. states may choose to form a regional bloc in order 
to get a better bargaining position within the World Trade Organisation (Mansfield 
and Reinhardt 2003). Another example is that the setup of regional integration 
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schemes allows member states to more easily negotiate bi-regional preferential trade 
agreements with other regions (so-called Interregionalism; Hänggi et al. 2006). 
Currently, this is regularly done in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM; Bersick 2004), 
between the EU and the MERCOSUR (Doctor 2007) and between the NAFTA and 
the MERCOSUR (Gratius 2005). 
 
The problem for a comparison of regional integration dynamics in- and outside 
of Europe is that the academic discussion has so far mainly concentrated on the first 
gain of regional integration, whereas the latter two have remained largely unexplored. 
Thus, it is well known that the abolition of trade barriers among developed countries 
leads to more international trade, more interdependence and finally to an increased 
demand for more regional integration. Yet the effects of regional integration as a 
development strategy or as a tool to increase bargaining power are still uncertain. It 
is unsure whether interdependence between the participating countries will increase 
– which would lead to dynamic effects also in the South – or whether it will stagnate 
or even decline. 
 
2.2 New Institutionalism and the Supply of Regional Integration 
 
Even though the member states join common gains from regional integration, 
the establishment of a regional integration scheme is not trivial, because they usually 
also have conflicting interests. Thus, the underlying preference constellation is one of 
a mixed motives game where some interests converge while others collide. In such a 
situation, common institutions are an instrument for the member states to commit 
themselves credibly to their common long-term interests, instead of following their 
particularistic short-term interests (Krapohl 2008, Moravcsik 1998: 73-77, North 1993, 
Shepsle 1991). In this respect, regional integration schemes can be understood as a 
form of international regime (Keohane 1984, Laursen 2005), which helps the 
participating states to solve their coordination and cooperation problems. However, 
different kinds of institutions are needed to solve different kinds of problems. 
 
When deciding on common rules, member states often face a coordination 
problem with distributive consequences (‘Battle-of-the-Sexes’). They all prefer 
common rules to individual measures, but they disagree about the concrete form of 
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these rules. It may be helpful in such situations if one of the member states is a 
hegemon, because such a powerful member state could on its own solve 
coordination problems and provide the club good regional integration (Mattli 1999). 
Such a regional group of states, which includes a benevolent hegemon, constitutes a 
privileged group (Olson 1965), because it may be much easier for them to cooperate 
than it is for other groups in which power is much more symmetrically distributed. 
Although the smaller member states of a privileged group have to adapt to the 
preferences of the hegemon, they still profit, because the hegemon can solve 
coordination problems and may be the paymaster in cases of distributive conflicts. 
Thus, the structure of the participating states may be very important for the success 
of a regional integration scheme.  
 
If the member states of a regional integration scheme do not constitute a 
privileged group, they must establish institutions which help them to solve their 
coordination problems. Such institutions are secretariats, parliamentary assemblies 
or expert bodies, which set the agenda for policy-making in the regional integration 
scheme (Pollack 2003, Tsebelis and Garrett 2001). Even though these agenda-
setters may not have formal power, their advice may nevertheless help to overcome 
conflicts, because it is deemed to be either relatively neutral (secretariats), especially 
legitimate (parliamentary assemblies) or based on outstanding expertise (expert 
bodies). Such advice can act as a focal point around which the expectations of actors 
converge (Schelling 1960). Thus, decision-making becomes easier and blockades 
are less likely. 
 
When implementing common regional rules, the member states often face a 
Prisoners’ Dilemma. Therein, they all agree that common rules be implemented, but 
each state faces incentives to act as a free-rider and not to implement the 
agreement. Because the game is a symmetric one, all member states feel the same 
temptation to exploit the good will of the others, and thus cooperation could fail. The 
problem may be mitigated if such games are played repeatedly. In such iterated 
Prisoners’ Dilemmas (Axelrod 1994), actors may learn to trust each other, and may 
see that reciprocal cooperation pays off in the end. However, cooperation is unstable 
even in such iterated games, because member states can always be tempted to 
utilise the short-term gains of defection if unusual pay-offs are at stake. In order to 
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stabilise cooperation, member states of a regional integration scheme may establish 
dispute settlement mechanisms, wherein court-like bodies decide about alleged 
defections of member states. Thereby, commitment expressed in such dispute 
settlement mechanisms is dependent on the degree of legalisation, i.e. the precision 
and obligation of legal rules, as well as the independence of their review (Abbott et 
al. 2000). 
 
A crucial question for some regional integration schemes is what happens if 
neither a hegemon nor formal institutions for agenda-setting or dispute settlement 
exist. A first assumption is that these schemes face huge difficulties in finding 
agreements and in ensuring the implementation of these agreements. Of course, 
both would significantly reduce the integration dynamic of the respective region. 
However, a second assumption is that informal institutions could take over the 
functions of formal institutions (Busse 2000). As sociological institutionalism states, 
common norms, belief systems or identities may bind actors as much as formal 
institutions (March and Olson 1998). If such informal institutions emerge within a 
certain region – or at least among the elites of the participating states –, this may as 
well indicate a credible commitment towards the adoption of common decisions and 
the implementation of these decisions. Nevertheless, the strength of such an informal 
commitment has yet to be proven. 
 
Again, the problem within the academic discussion is that it has so far mainly 
concentrated on the EU, whereas the institutions of the NAFTA, the MERCOSUR, 
the SADC and the ASEAN have largely been neglected. It is relatively well known, 
how independent the Commission is (Steunenberg, Koboldt and Schmidtchen 1996), 
how much influence the European Parliament has (Tsebelis and Garrett 2001) and 
how the European Court of Justice has influenced European integration (Alter 2001). 
In contrast, much less is known about credible commitment in the institutions of other 
regional integration schemes, let alone the effects of hegemons in some regions or of 
informal institutions in others. Even though none of the other regional integration 
scheme is truly familiar with supranational institutions, this does not necessarily 
mean that the existing intergovernmental or even informal institutions do not indicate 
any credible commitment. 
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2.3 Feedback Mechanisms, Interaction Effects and Integration Dynamic 
 
In order for dynamic integration processes to evolve, it is not enough that 
cooperation demand is met with the respective supply, but it is also necessary that 
feedback mechanisms occur in order for further cooperation to become possible. If 
cooperation itself produces the preconditions for further cooperation, one can speak 
of a self-sustaining integration dynamic which needs not be reinforced by external 
factors. Generally, such feedback mechanisms may occur on the demand and supply 
sides of regional integration, as well as by an interaction of both. 
 
The implementation of a cooperation project may have influence on the 
interests of and within the participating states. E.g. the abolishment of trade barriers 
in a certain sector may lead to economic structural change within that sector. If only 
the most competitive export industries survive this change, the former opponents of 
trade liberalisation leave the market, and the remaining producers prefer freer trade 
in order to export their goods. The result is that the demand for intraregional trade 
liberalisation increases further (Keohane et al. 2002). Besides, initial cooperation 
may not only change interests within the respective sector, but also within other 
policy areas. Such spill-over relies on the fact that integration of some policy areas 
has negative externalities for other areas. E.g. the establishment of a single market 
has deregulatory effects for freely traded goods, and this deregulation must be met 
with re-regulation at the regional level (Krapohl 2008, Majone 1994, Scharpf 2003). 
Thus, more demand for regional rules emerges, and the member states may 
delegate more competencies for regulatory policy-making to the upper level. In the 
end, both the change of interests within a policy area and the spill-over into other 
areas may lead to further steps of regional integration, and may consequently initiate 
an independent and self-supporting dynamic. 
 
The problem is that not all gains of regional integration have the same dynamic 
effects on actors’ interests. Among developed and specialised economies, the 
abolition of trade barriers will probably have the most direct effects on market 
participants’ interests. Due to increased intraregional trade, interdependence 
between different economies is growing, and this is likely to produce spill-over effects 
either within a certain sector or towards other policy areas. However, if regional 
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integration is part of a development strategy, the effects on actors’ interests are likely 
to be more indirect. If the goal of regional integration is to attract foreign direct 
investments or development aid, this does not lead directly to increased 
interdependence and changing interests. Only in cases where the development 
strategy has some success and the participating economies develop, will more 
interdependence evolve and interests are likely to change towards more integration. 
And if the goal of regional integration is to improve the bargaining position in 
comparison to other regions, the dynamic effects are even more indirect. Even if the 
respective region is successful in bargaining about preferential trade agreements 
with another region, this will, first of all, increase the interdependence with this 
external region. Internal interdependence only grows if the trade with another region 
leads to economic development and increasing trade within the own region. 
 
An integration dynamic may also evolve if economic demand for regional 
integration meets changing supply conditions. Institutions may change the bargaining 
situation within a regional integration scheme by giving access to new actors and by 
establishing new decision-making rules. Firstly, if the member states set up 
secretariats, parliamentary assemblies or expert bodies, these may try to set the 
agenda of decision-making in a way that results in further integration (Pollack 1997). 
The same applies to dispute settlement mechanisms which may influence the 
integration dynamic with their case law (e.g. for the case of the European Court of 
Justice see: Alter and Meunier-Aitsahalia 1994). Further, regional institutions may 
provide access for private interests, which can then leave their national governments 
aside and directly articulate their demands at the regional level. And secondly, 
member states may commit themselves to giving up unanimity vote in some policy 
areas, which would simplify further cooperation, because not every reluctant member 
state needs to agree to new policies (Tsebelis and Garrett 2001). Or member states 
are bound by previous decisions, which they cannot change due to high majority 
requirements, and which lead to different solutions than an intergovernmental 
bargaining system (Gehring 2005, Pierson 1996, Scharpf 1989).  
 
All in all, there are various ways in which institutions may influence decision-
making in order to make further regional integration possible. Thereby, it is important 
to state that the institutional dynamic is likely to be as larger, as more credible 
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commitment the institutions express, because such commitment makes a rollback by 
the member states more difficult and less likely. In contrast, institutional dynamic is 
much less likely to occur if regional integration is mainly supplied by a hegemon. In 
such cases, institutional commitment by the member states is less needed, because 
the smaller member states have to follow the rules of the hegemon anyway, whereas 
the hegemon is unlikely to reduce its power by binding itself to regional institutions. 
Thus, the integration dynamic is mainly dependent on the interests of the hegemon, 
and institutional lock-ins or spill-overs will probably not emerge. 
 
The most integration dynamic will probably occur in regional integration 
schemes in which favourably demand and supply factors interact with each other. In 
such a situation, increasing intraregional trade leads to increasing interdependence 
and increasing demand for regional rules. This demand can then be addressed to 
strong regional institutions, which try to satisfy it in order to strengthen their position 
and influence. As a result of new regional rules, intraregional trade becomes even 
easier and is likely to increase further. The process starts again – albeit on a higher 
level of regional integration. In this way, the regional polity becomes step-by-step 
institutionalised (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997). 
 
3. Cases of Regional Integration 
 
In the following empirical part of the paper, the theoretically deduced variables 
will be used to build up hypotheses in regard to the integration dynamic of different 
regional integration schemes around the world. Thereby, it becomes evident on first 
view that the several integration schemes differ significantly on both the demand and 
supply side of regional integration (see table 1). Whereas the EU, the NAFTA and the 
ASEAN + 3 (ASEAN with Japan, China and Korea) are projects of North-North or 
North-South integration, the MERCOSUR, the SADC and the ASEAN (without Japan, 
China and Korea) consist only of developing countries. And whereas the EU and the 
MEROSUR are familiar with a variety of formal institutions, the NAFTA and the SADC 
are grouped around hegemons, and the ASEAN, as well as the ASEAN + 3 are 
based on informal institutions.  
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Table 1: The Demand for and Supply of Regional Integration  
in Different Regional Integration Schemes 
 
  Supply of regional Integration 
  
Formal 
Institutions 
Hegemon 
Informal 
Institutions 
North-North or 
North-South 
Integration 
EU NAFTA 
ASEAN + 3 
(with Japan, 
China, Korea) Demand for 
Regional 
Integration South-South 
Integration 
MERCOSUR SADC ASEAN 
 
3.1 European Union: North-North Integration and Supranational Institutions 
 
Even though European integration started in order to preserve peace in Europe 
after the Second World War, the instrument for this was economic integration. The 
structure of the economies of the initial six member states allowed for high economic 
gains by trade liberalisation. The potential for these gains grew even with several 
rounds of enlargement. Today, the EU mainly consists of highly industrialised and 
specialised economies and a few less advanced developed countries from Southern, 
Middle and Eastern Europe, which have comparative cost advantages in labour-
intensive production. Consequently, high comparative cost advantages and 
economies of scale can be utilised by intraregional trade (Mattli 1999, Schirm 2002). 
Today, around two thirds of all exports of EU countries remain within the region.1 
Intraregional trade is the most extensive of all regional integration schemes.  
 
In Europe, this high economic demand for regional integration meets the highly 
differentiated institutional structure of the EU, which can be regarded as the most 
complex international organisation in the world (Gehring 2002). The Commission has 
the monopoly of legislative initiative, the European Parliament (EP) is a co-equal 
legislator to the Council for most legislative acts, and the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) has far-reaching competencies not only pertaining to disputes between the 
                                               
1 World Trade Organisation (2006): “International Trade Statistics 2006”, 
(http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/statis_e.htm; 7/4/2008), 66. 
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member states, but also to claims of private citizens against member states or EU 
institutions. Thus, not only is the economic demand for regional integration high, but 
the supply conditions are also very favourable to integration. 
 
The EU is an example for favourable demand and supply conditions which 
interact and mutually reinforce each other. This led to the dynamic process, which is 
stressed by neofunctionalists (Haas 1958, Schmitter 2002) and historical 
institutionalists (Pierson 1996, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997), but this can also 
be found in the work of intergovernmentalists (Moravcsik 1998). Initial trade 
liberalisation led to increasing intraregional trade, which in turn led to more demand 
for regional rules. This demand was not only addressed to the member states, which 
amended the treaties repeatedly, but also to supranational institutions like the 
Commission and the ECJ, which successfully aimed to reinforce integration with their 
competencies in policy-making or dispute settlement. Once a further integration step 
was adopted, even more trade became possible, which again increased 
interdependency and the demand for regional rules. This process led from a customs 
union in the 1960s to the Single Market in the 1980s and later to the Economic and 
Monetary Union in the 1990s. For this development, it is not so important whether 
regional integration was supplied by intergovernmental bargaining or by 
supranational institutions. However, it is more decisive that one step of regional 
integration makes further steps possible –because it changes the interests of the 
member states and the rules of future decision-making. 
 
3.2 North American Free Trade Agreement: North-South Integration and a Hegemon 
 
Since its setup in 1994, NAFTA is the world’s second largest regional market, 
after the EU. It is a free trade area with no internal tariffs, but without common 
external tariffs to non-NAFTA countries. As in the EU, the economic gains, which can 
be utilised by intraregional trade, are high (Appendini und Bislev 1999). Although one 
member state – namely Mexico – is still an emerging market, precisely this fact 
contributes positively to its comparative cost advantage. Labour-intensive production 
is increasingly outsourced from the US to Mexico, where wages are comparatively 
low (Chase 2003, Schirm 2002). Due to its access to the US market, Mexico became 
very attractive for foreign direct investments and experienced an investment boom 
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from the US and from outside NAFTA in the 1990s (Hufbauer and Schott 2005). This 
transnational division of labour led to increasing trade within NAFTA. Currently, 
roughly half of the exports from NAFTA countries remain within the region2 – which is 
the second highest number of all regional integration schemes.  
 
This economic dynamic of the NAFTA meets a weak institutional architecture. 
The NAFTA is based on one comprehensive treaty and two side agreements on 
environmental and labour protection, but there is no secondary law similar to EU 
legislation (Kaiser 1998). A trade commission exists, but it has only administrative 
competencies and is understaffed. The NAFTA is not equipped with a parliamentary 
assembly, and six different dispute settlement mechanisms have been established 
instead of a regional court. However, in contrast to the EU, the NAFTA is clearly 
dominated by a hegemon: which is the US. It is evident that regional integration in 
Northern America means more an integration of the Mexican market (and to a 
smaller extent of the Canadian market) into the US market than vice versa.  
 
Regional integration within NAFTA is a demand-driven process, whereas the 
supply side is unlikely to produce dynamic. Increasing demands for regional rules 
within the NAFTA can only be satisfied in two ways. The first, which already 
happened once during the ratification phase of the agreement, is that of 
intergovernmental negotiations. After the NAFTA treaty was signed, the newly 
elected US president Bill Clinton placed pressure on Canada and Mexico to accept 
two side agreements on environmental and labour protection (Hufbauer and Schott 
2005, Mayer 1998). Clinton threatened the other states by claiming that ratification 
would fail within congress if these side agreements were not part of the deal. Canada 
and Mexico had to accept this in order not to endanger their free access to the large 
US market. Similar side agreements could again be adopted if these were in the 
interests of the US, and if the US put enough pressure on Canada and Mexico by 
threatening to exit the agreement. A second, but less likely, mechanism for the 
supply of regional integration is the dispute settlement system (Abbott 2000). In some 
of the six mechanisms, private plaintiffs may bring forward claims against states if 
these are deemed to infringe on the NAFTA treaty or the side agreements. It may be 
that the dispute settlement system builds up case law which interprets the treaty or 
                                               
2 World Trade Organisation (2007): “International Trade Statistics 2007”, 
(http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/statis_e.htm; 7/4/2008), 23. 
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the side agreements in a way that reinforces regional integration (for the well-known 
example of the EU see Alter and Meunier-Aitsahalia 1994). However, it can be stated 
that the bodies which make decisions about such claims are tribunals recruited on an 
ad hoc basis from the member states so that the member states keep full control 
over the development of case law. Thus, it is less likely than in the European case 
that the dispute settlement system is able to significantly influence integration. 
 
3.3 Mercado Común del Sur: South-South Integration and Intergovernmental 
Institutions 
 
The MERCOSUR, which was founded in 1991, is one of the most promising 
regional integration projects between developing countries (Vaillant 2005). Its aim is 
to liberalise trade step-by-step with the goal of achieving a single market and, in the 
end, an economic and monetary union. Currently, it is formally a customs union, 
although weak implementation of regional rules leads to the fact that uniform external 
tariffs have not yet been established (Pohl 2003). Despite its ambitious aims, the 
MERCOSUR suffers, on the demand side, from the typical shortcomings of South-
South integration. Because of relatively similar and less-developed economies, 
intraregional trade is not as important as in the north (Schirm 2002). Although 
MERCOSUR managed to double its share of intraregional trade, from only 10% in 
1990 to 20 % in 2000, it declined again to 14% in 2006 as a result of the Argentinean 
economic crisis at the beginning of the new millennium.3 Thus, it is very important for 
the MERCOSUR to become more attractive for foreign direct investments and to 
negotiate about preferential trade agreements with the NAFTA and the EU. And 
indeed, during the 1990s, the MECOSUR countries experienced a boom of foreign 
direct investments (Pohl 2003), but again the Argentinean crisis impeded this 
development. Further, the MERCOSUR negotiated with the NAFTA concerning the 
set up of a Free Trade Area of the Americas and with the EU concerning a 
preferential trade agreement, but neither negotiation has yet been successfully 
concluded.  
 
On the supply side, this uncertain demand for regional integration in the 
MERCOSUR meets highly differentiated regional institutions, which follow, to some 
                                               
3 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2007): “Trade and Development Report 
2007”, (http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdr2007_en.pdf; 7.4.2008), 95. 
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extent, the example of the EU (Vaillant 2005): The MERCOSUR has a Council like 
that of the EU; a ‘Group of the Common Market’, a trade commission and an 
administrative secretariat together fulfil the functions of the European Commission; a 
parliamentary assembly resembles the ‘old’ EP, before this became directly elected 
by the EU citizens in 1978; and finally, a dispute settlement mechanism and a 
standing appellate tribunal take over judicial functions like the ECJ (Malamud and 
Schmitter 2006, Pohl 2003). Although there has been no far-reaching delegation of 
competencies to real supranational institutions so far, the MERCOSUR is 
nevertheless designed to dynamically produce legal rules in order to increasingly 
commit the member states to the goals of market integration (Gratius 2005). 
 
In contrast to the NAFTA, the MERCOSUR is a supply-driven project, but the 
economic demand is less likely to produce integration dynamic. The low level of 
intraregional trade indicates that there are few interdependencies between the 
member states, and that there is consequently little demand for regional rules. This 
explains why the MERCOSUR suffers from a chronic implementation deficit. 
Regional rules are adopted for political reasons, but they are often ignored, because 
there are no stakeholders who push for their implementation. The crucial question for 
the regional integration dynamic is whether or not the MERCOSUR will be successful 
with its strategy to attract foreign direct investments, to develop the member states’ 
economies and to create more trade and interdependence between those states. The 
investment boom and the growing share of intraregional trade in the 1990s point in 
this direction. However, when the Argentinean economic crisis put an end to this 
development and the numbers of foreign direct investment and intraregional trade 
declined, the member states widely stopped the implementation of MERCOSUR 
legislation (Pohl 2003). Nevertheless, the member states seemed to be willing to stop 
this ‘Mercosclerosis’ when they set up the standing appellate tribunal in 2004 (and 
later the parliamentary assembly in 2007). Thereby, they deepened their commitment 
in the MERCOSUR in order to once again become more attractive to foreign 
investors. If this will proves successful, not only foreign direct investments, but also 
the share of intraregional trade are likely to increase, and the integration dynamic 
may re-emerge.  
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3.4 Southern African Development Community: South-South Integration and a 
Hegemon 
 
Of all the different regional integration schemes in Africa, the SADC is probably 
one of the few with modest chances for success (Mair and Peters-Berries 2001). 
SADC’s predecessor, the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference 
(SADCC), was founded in 1980 by the non-apartheid states in Southern Africa in 
order to mobilise and coordinate development aid, to support each other and to 
reduce dependence on hostile apartheid South Africa (le Pere and Tjønneland 2005). 
However, when apartheid ended in 1994, South Africa became the largest member 
of the reformed SADC. Since then, economic integration has become an important 
means for the SADC to foster development. Currently, the SADC is trying to establish 
a free trade area, but low implementation records of its member states work against 
the actual achievement of this goal. Like the MERCOSUR, the SADC suffers from 
the typical problem of South-South integration on the demand side. The participating 
economies are minimally developed and export mainly raw materials to the North 
(Hansohm and Shilimela 2006). Thus, the potential gains of intraregional trade are 
low. Currently, the share of intraregional trade is roughly 8%.4 The SADC is trying to 
attract development aid and foreign direct investment, but so far, this has not led to 
significant more diversification and intraregional trade.  
 
On the supply side, the SADC is distinguished by the presence of a potential 
hegemon, which is South Africa (Mulaudzi 2006). However, in contrast to the NAFTA, 
it is uncertain whether South Africa is really willing to fulfil the role of a benevolent 
hegemon and to provide regional integration on its own. It is also unclear whether 
such a development even be accepted by the other member states. In recent years, 
the SADC has also reformed its institutional structure along the lines of the EU (Vogt 
2007). The SADC currently has a summit similar to the Council of the EU, a Council 
of Ministers, a strengthened secretariat, a parliamentary form similar to the EP before 
1978 and a tribunal for dispute settlements. Given a chronic understaffing of these 
bodies and a low implementation record of the member states, it is uncertain, how 
this reformed institutional structure will influence the future integration dynamic 
(Oosthuizen 2006). 
                                               
4 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2007): “Trade and Development Report 
2007”, (http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdr2007_en.pdf; 7.4.2008), 95. 
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A self-sustaining integration dynamic in Southern Africa is faced with two 
fundamental problems. On the demand side, it is unlikely that intraregional trade and 
thus interdependence will increase between the member states, so that the demand 
for regional rules is also unlikely to increase. And on the supply side, the role of the 
potential hegemon is uncertain and it is unlikely that the regional institutions could 
step in, if South Africa refuses to play its role and does not provide regional 
integration. However, a regional integration dynamic could nevertheless emerge if it 
is supported by donors of developmental aid. One of the main goals of the SADC is 
attract developmental aid, and this gives donors like the EU an instrument to 
influence the integration process. The EU could use this on both the demand and 
supply side. On the demand side, it could reinforce interdependence by financing 
projects (e.g. infrastructure) with a regional scope. And on the supply side, it could 
strengthen the supranational institutions if these, and not the member states, become 
the addressees of aid. 
 
3.5 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (plus Japan, China and Korea): South-
South or North-South Integration and Informal Institutions 
 
Originally, the ASEAN was founded (in 1967) as a forum for loose regional 
cooperation and as a security community against the threat of communism in 
Southeast Asia (Acharya 2001). However, similar to the case of the SADC, the 
former enemies (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar) became members of the 
ASEAN in the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War was (Ufen 2005). As a result 
of the disappearance of external threat, the ASEAN was in search of a new task, 
and, in 1992, it decided to establish a free trade area by reducing tariffs to a 
maximum of 5% by 2002. Currently, this ASEAN Free Trade Area has, to a large 
degree, been implemented, but sensitive product sectors are still excluded from trade 
liberalisation (Cuyvers et al. 2005). As in other cases of South-South integration, the 
problem on the demand side of the ASEAN is that intraregional trade is less 
important than trade with other regions. Although the share of intraregional trade is 
roughly 25%5 (which is the highest share of regional integration schemes in the 
South), this number is significantly lower if one subtracts trade which is exported to 
                                               
5 World Trade Organisation (2007): “International Trade Statistics 2007”, 
(http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/statis_e.htm; 7/4/2008), 28. 
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other regions via the entrepot Singapore. However, the potential for economic gains 
by intraregional trade are significantly higher in the so-called ASEAN+3, which 
includes all ASEAN countries with the addition of Japan, China and Korea (Nabers 
2005). Though the latter three do not officially participate in AFTA, they are 
connected to it by a range of bilateral trade agreements with ASEAN countries. 
Because Japan is a highly industrialised country, and because China represents an 
enormous market, the potentials for comparative cost advantages and economies of 
scale are much higher than within ASEAN alone.  
 
However, the ASEAN does not only face problems on the demand side, but 
also on the supply side of regional integration. Despite the lack of a regional 
hegemon in Southeast Asia, the ASEAN states have only established very few formal 
regional institutions. Decisions are passed at intergovernmental meetings of different 
levels (head of states, ministers or bureaucrats), which are supported by a small 
secretariat for administrative and coordinative tasks (Ufen 2005). The ASEAN+3 
does not even have a secretariat. A parliamentary assembly and a dispute settlement 
mechanism do not exist in either scheme. Whereas there is an obvious lack of formal 
institutions in the ASEAN, the importance of informal institutions is repeatedly 
stressed in the literature (Acharya 2001, Busse 2000). Accordingly, cooperation 
between the member states is based on a set of informal principles which are 
summarised as the ‘ASEAN way’. This includes informality, organisational 
minimalism, conflict avoidance, consultation and consensus building (Ufen 2005). 
The question is, whether these informal institutions are strong enough to replace the 
commitment to formal institutions. Whereas some scholars argue that the ‘ASEAN 
way’ is the reason for ASEAN’s success in dealing with intraregional conflicts, critics 
conclude that it is the reason for the ASEAN’s slow success in regional integration. 
 
As in the SADC, a regional integration dynamic in the ASEAN meets problems 
on both the demand and supply sides of regional integration. Intraregional trade is 
not very important, and thus, interdependence and demand for regional rules are 
unlikely to increase as a result of trade liberalisation. And the extremely weak 
institutional structure of the ASEAN is also unlikely to generate an integration 
dynamic. However, the situation is somewhat different concerning the ASEAN+3, 
which some observers believe to become the most important regional cooperation in 
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Asia (Nabers 2005). Here, the demand for regional integration is more likely to 
increase, because participation of Japan and China allow for the utilisation of more 
comparative cost advantages and economies of scale. Nevertheless, it is still an 
open question, whether the ASEAN+3 will be able to overcome its weakness on the 
supply side. The informal institutions of the ‘ASEAN way’ maybe have been adequate 
for loose coordination in the past, but it is unlikely that they will be able to ensure the 
necessary commitment for closer integration in the future. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper was to present a theoretical approach which is able to 
overcome two surprising gaps in the academic literature. On the one hand, the New 
Institutionalism is widely discussed using the example of European integration, but so 
far it has not been systematically applied to other cases of regional integration. And 
on the other hand, the International Political Economy has provided some 
comparative studies concerning regional integration, but it has neglected its dynamic 
character. The proposed solution is to conceptualise regional integration as a club 
good, and to elaborate economic demand and institutional supply factors which could 
lead to the establishment of regional integration schemes. Integration dynamic may 
occur if one or more of these factors changes due to previous integration steps. In 
this way, regional integration itself may provide the preconditions for further 
integration steps. A self-sustaining dynamic may occur, which needs not necessarily 
to be externally reinforced. 
 
This theoretical approach was then applied to the five most important regional 
integration schemes in the world in order to establish hypotheses about their 
integration dynamic. It became obvious that different integration schemes are faced 
with very different problems during the integration process. Whereas the EU is surely 
the most successful of all integration schemes – because it scores well on both the 
demand and supply dimension – the relative dynamic of the others cannot yet be fully 
assessed. The NAFTA is pushed forward by the economic demands of stakeholders, 
but needs stronger regional institutions in order to increase integration. The 
MERCOSUR has these institutions, but its economic future is uncertain. The SADC 
faces difficulties on both the demand and supply sides, but it could be supported by 
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outside donors of developmental aid. And the ASEAN faces similar problems as the 
SADC, but an enlargement of its free trade area to Japan, China and Korea could 
lead to a new momentum. If at all, one could hypothesise at this stage of research 
that the EU is the most dynamic regional integration scheme, that the NAFTA and the 
MERCOSUR take a middle position, and that the SADC and the ASEAN face the 
most problems in establishing a self-sustaining integration dynamic. 
 
It is obvious that these conclusions are not the result of intensive empirical 
research, but that they are derived from the theoretical argument. Thus, there is still a 
lot of work to be done. Firstly, the theoretical concept needs to be further elaborated 
and operationalised for the empirical work. The list of demand and supply factors is 
probably not definite, and the same applies to feedback mechanisms and interaction 
effects. These factors must be operationalised in a way that allows them to be 
compared throughout all the different regions. And secondly, theory-driven case 
studies on the NAFTA, the MERCOSUR, the SADC and the ASEAN are necessary in 
order to prove the hypotheses derived from the theoretical approach. Thereby, it is 
important that these case studies observe the same variables in all the different 
regions in order to lay the foundation for a fruitful comparison. 
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